Normal Accidents

Living with High-Risk Technologies

Charles Perrow

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Regular Accidents analyzes the interpersonal side of technological risk. (At Chernobyl, tests of a fresh safety system helped produce the meltdown and subsequent fire. The first edition fulfilled one reviewer's prediction that it "may mark the beginning of accident analysis. Charles Perrow argues that the traditional engineering approach to ensuring safety--building in more warnings and safeguards--fails because systems complexity makes failures inevitable.) By recognizing two sizes of risk--complex versus linear interactions, and restricted versus loose coupling--this book provides a effective framework for analyzing dangers and the organizations that insist we run them. He asserts that standard precautions, by adding to complexity, may help create new types of accidents." In the brand new afterword to the edition Perrow evaluations the extensive work on the major accidents of the last fifteen years, including Bhopal, Chernobyl, and the Challenger disaster. The brand new postscript probes what the author considers to become the "quintessential 'Normal Accident'" of our period: the Y2K computer problem.

A brilliant analysis. This book can be an expatiation of Murphy's Law. Initially got the book having found it in the feet notes of "Command and Control. The Challenger explosion, for example, offers been blamed on a number of lapses in human judgment. But once one thing on the shuttle failed - I this case the O-rings on the solid rocket booster, an unanticipated cascade of failures adopted. Similarly, the accident at Three Mile Island resulted from a faulty alarm that was known to be faulty, and was consequently ignored even while temperatures in the containment dome were skyrocketing. The failure of an element, coupled with individual misinterpretation of the failure. led to a cascade of poor events and wrong decisions. Perrow emphasizes these occasions might be attributed to human error, however the humans involved have not seen this sequences of occasions before, such a cascade of related failures was hardly ever anticipated, and the humans haven't any way to understand what is happening. So "operator error" is an illusion. In fact, the safety precautions can increase the risk of catastrophic failure. The theory laid in it is contested by various other authors, but still it has merit. Interesting, but very dry Though it contains a lot of useful information, the book was much less readable and much more dry of a read than I'd have hoped. Any cultural scientist, physical scientist, or policymaker should browse this book. Only got through the first 65%. This book was written prior to the astounding disaster of Fukushima, but that group of catastrophes certainly matches Perrow's paradigm." Insightful framework, poorly-reinforced political conclusions Perrow has an insightful framework for understanding the complex systems we live with each day and the ways they fail. Mixed bag. Author assumes the world won't change and people won't get appreciably better at running highly complex systems The book is dated. The author makes many dooms day predictions about the nuclear and industrial aviation sectors that didn't pan out provided the last 30 years. Author assumes the world won't change and folks won't get appreciably better at working highly complicated systems.Certainly not a page turner. details the risk inherent in a highly complicated systems, but a lot of theory and stats make it dry Interesting book that presents how highly complex systems with significant inherent risk, such as nuclear plants, oil tankers, and many more, can fail catastrophically due to their complexity, no matter how many safety methods are put set up. It reads like the brain dump of an writer before he got around to turning it into a book. The writer argues that complex systems are susceptible to failure and that failures are unpredictable because, in complicated systems, the way failing elements fail synergistically is inherently difficult to foresee. On the drawback, one is surface down by the barrage of theory and statistics, which as the publication goes on, gets also drier, and more theoretical. However, he spends his bottom line trying to create policy recommendations that aren't actually well backed by his own framework. Either because there are emergent properties that can never become anticipated (E. TOday, March 19, 2011, nuke disaster in Japan, even more timely than ever. Read this. Eye wateringly terrible This is an eye wateringly terrible book to learn. Aside from poorly explained feedback on nuclear criticality incidents and naval nuclear reactors, the earlier chapters of the book are technically quite sound, and Perrow's framework is a great starting point to think about steps to make complex systems as secure and resilient as feasible. Five Stars lots to learn I gravitated to his understandable explanations of the matrix of complex v linear and loose v tight coupling. Exemplory case of linear-tight is definitely a bakery, and a University is definitely complex-loose. Nuke plants are complex-tight. But according to Perrow, also if there were tertiary back-ups up higher, another, additional unanticipatable flaw, might have emerged anyway.I highly recommend nearly all of the book for anyone that'll be designing, operating, or criticizing complex systems.P. Chlorine is usually a toxic green gas, Sodium can be a reactive gray steel. Its very so bad I very much doubt I'm going to make it to the end. Case in

point, the back-up generators for cooling Japan's today melting down nuke plant were on the ground to safeguard against typhoons from disabling them, however the tsunami surely got to them. I trust him that no quantity of added basic safety features could be economically installed to create nuke plants safe. Great Insights Superb insights insightful analysis This book is the base of a whole theory safely. Must read for anyone who would like to undestand safety.It desperately needs the services of an excellent editor and a more structured narrative with less repetition. Perrow is normally pessimistic about nuclear power. Extremely important as fundamental reading for just about any scholar in safety. Five Stars Good read for everybody how want to know why systems fail. The fact that people haven't had even more reactor disasters, Perrow says, is because the gadgets haven't yet had period to express themselves. March 2011, TIMELY Emergent Properties I read this 12 years back. If you would like to consider yourself somebody who studies safety you have to read this book. Glad I rented, as it certainly wasn't worth owning. Any text messages it may be trying to mention are lost in the atrocious composing. Combined they are table salt, partly responsible for life on earth, nevertheless, you could NEVER have predicted that before hand from the starting ingredients) and or the cost $$$$$$ is prohibative. Perrow launched me to tightly coupled, complex systems like nuke plants.

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